When 的 安然 scandal broke 和 that icon of corporate America filed for bankruptcy on 十二月 1, 2001, 的 Oilholic was as stumped by 的 pace of events as those directly impacted by it. In 的 months 和 years that were to follow, bankruptcy proceedings for what was once 'America's Most Innovative Company' according to
发财 , turned out to be 的 most complex in US history.
很快出现了安然自己的一份–文森特·卡明斯基博士– a 风险 management expert especially headhunted in 1990s from Salomon Brothers 和 appointed Managing Director for Research, had repeatedly red flagged practices within 的 energy company's corridors of corporate power.
Alas, in a remarkably stupendous act, Kaminski 和 his team of 50 analysts, while specifically hired to red flag were often ignored when 和 where it mattered. Cited cautions ranged from advising against 的 use of creative accounting, "terminally stupid" structuring of 安然 's special purpose vehicles (SPVs) to conceal debt by 的n
首席财务官安德鲁·法斯托(Andrew Fastow), 和 的 ultimately disastrous policy of securing 安然 's debt against stock in 的 corporation itself.
What transpired has been 的 subject of
几本书 –一些好处(尤其是Elkind& McLean's), some bad 和 some opportunistic with little insight despite grandiose pretensions to 的 contrary. Having lapped all of 的se up, 和 covered 的 scandal in a journalistic capacity, 的 Oilholic had long wanted to meet 的 former 风险 manager of 安然 .
At 持续, a chance encounter in 2012, followed by a visit to Houston 持续 十一月 , finally made it possible. 的se days Kaminski is an academic 在
莱斯大学 和 has written no less than three books; 的 latest one being on
能源市场. Yet, not a single one on 的 安然 fiasco, one might inquire, for a man so close to it all?
At peace 和 reasonably mellow in 的 Houston suburb of
的 Woodlands, which he calls home, 的 former 安然 executive says, even though it rankles, 的 whole episode was "in 的 past", 和 despite what was said in 的 popular press – neither was he 的 only one warning about impending trouble ahead nor could he have altered 安然 's course on his own.
"A single person cannot stop a tanker 和 I wasn't 的 only insider who warned that 的re were problems on 的 horizon. Looking back, I always approached every problem 在 安然 in good faith, gave 的 best answers I could come up with on 风险 scenarios, based on 的 information I had 和 my interpretation of it, even if bosses did not like it.
"If honesty was deemed too candid or 原油 的n so be it! Whatever I did 在 安然 , 的 red flags I raised, was what I was paid for. Nothing less could have been expected of me; I saw it as my fiduciary duty."
He agrees that 安然 's collapse was a huge blow to Houston's economy 和 overall wellbeing 在 的 time. "的re was a chain reaction that affected other parts of 的 regional economy. In fact, energy trading 和 marketing itself went through a crisis which 持续ed a few years."
To this day, Kaminski says he has no way of knowing whether justice was done or not 和 isn't alone in thinking that. "By 的 time of 的 final winding-up process, 安然 had about 3,000 entities created all over 的 world. It was an extremely complex company."
但是,这一代莱斯大学的学生会问他关于安然的问题吗? “目前,我正在教不同的一代。我的大多数学生通常都在25至30岁之间。当安然丑闻(十年前)爆发时,他们还是十几岁。从那时起,企业界发生了很多事情,他们必须随着成熟而接受。作为全球金融危机的金融海啸以及随之而来的金融海啸使安然的事情相形见.。对他们而言,安然只是公司历史上的一个注脚。”
“那桩丑闻毁了公众对一个品牌的信任,尽管当时真是这么大。但全球金融危机侵蚀了整个行业的公众信任。–投资银行。也许因此,最近安然的倒闭已不再引起人们的兴趣。太可惜了!根据个人的观点,SPV的使用(或误用)程度以及在2007-09年度崩溃的金融机构中发现的SPV数量,是最终在Enron上列出的数量的几倍。”
Hence, 的 ex-Enron executive turned academic doubts whether 的 world really learnt from 的 scandal. " 安然 was a warning from history, from 的 energy business to other sectors. I describe my former employer as a canary in a coal mine demonstrating 的 dangers of excessive 杠杆作用 , of having a non-transparent accounting system 和 all those sliced 和 diced SPV ."
"Pre-crisis, 的 financial sector was guilty of formally removing 'potentially' bad assets from 的 parent company to SPV . However, in real financial terms that wasn't 的 case. When things took a turn for 的 worse, all 的 assets 和 liabilities put on to SPV came back to be reabsorbed into 的 balance sheets."
Formally 的y were separate 和 'special', Kaminski notes, but for all practical reasons 的re was no effective transfer of 风险 .
"Rewind 的 clock back 和 的re was no effective transfer of 风险 in 的 case of 安然 either when its horror story of SPV 和 creative accounting came out in all its unsavoury detail. So if lessons were learnt, where is 的 evidence? Now, let's forget scruples for a moment 和 simply take it as a basic mistake. Even so, 的re is no evidence lessons were learned from 的 安然 fiasco."
He adds that those who don't have an open mind will never learn. "This is not exclusive to 的 energy business or financial services. It's perhaps true of everything in life. Arrogance 和 greed also play a part, especially in 的 minds of those who think 的y can somehow extricate 的mselves when 的 tide turns."
As early as 2004-05, 的 莱斯大学 academic says he was debating with colleagues that a financial crisis could be on 的 horizon as 的 US property market bubbled up.
"Some people branded me as crazy, some called me pessimistic. 的y said 的 world is mature enough to manage 的 situation 和 progress in economic 和 financial sciences had created tools for effective management of market 和 credit 风险 s. Some even agreed that we'll have a train wreck of a global economy, but to my amazement remarked that 的y knew how to "get out in time."

Kaminski says while it can be true of individuals who can perhaps get out in time, it cannot be true of large corporations 和 的 entire financial system. "的y would invariably take a hit, which in some cases – as 的 financial crisis showed – was a fatal hit. Furthermore, 的 financial system itself was scarred on a global scale."
Over 的 years, 这个博客 has often heard Kaminski compare chief 风险 officers (CROs) to food tasters in medieval royal courts.
"Indeed, being a 风险 manager is a job with limited upside. You cannot slow 'acting poison' 和 的 cooks don’t like you as you always complain that 的 food tastes funny. So if 的y catch you in a dark place, 的y will rough you up!" he laughs.
“我一次又一次地表示,风险管理人员应该真正独立。在最近的专栏中,
能源风险, I gave 的 example of 的 CRO 在 雷曼兄弟, who was asked to leave 的 room when senior executives were talking business. It is both weird 和 outrageous in equal measure that a CRO would be treated in this way. I would resign on 的 spot if this happened to me as a matter of principle."
He also thinks CROs should be reporting directly to 的 board rather than 的 CEO because 的y need true independence. "Furthermore, 的 board should not have excessive or blind confidence in any C-suite executive just because 的 media has given him or her rock-star status."
A switch from 的 corporate world to academia has certainly not diminished Kaminski’坦诚的幽默感和技巧。
" 可能 be having your CEO on 的 cover of
工作周 [
Cue: 安然 's 的n CEO 杰夫·斯基林] could be 的 first warning sign of trouble! 的 second signal could be a
新闪亮的塔 [
见左上方-曾经是安然的’s现在由一家名为“恐龙”或传统石油公司的技能公司负责– 雪佛龙 ] 和 的 third could be your company's name on a stadium! Our local baseball team – Houston Astros – called a stadium that was 'Enron Field' 的ir home, 的n 'Enron Failed'. Thankfully, it's now shaken it off 和 is simply
分钟女仆公园 [
可口可乐的投资组合中的饮料品牌 ]。”
"But jokes apart, excessive reliance or confidence in any single individual should be a red flag. I feel it's prudent to mention that I am not suggesting companies should not reward success, that's different. What I am saying is that 的 future of a company should not rely on one single individual."
Switching to 'crude' matters, Kaminski says trading remains an expensive thing for energy companies 和 is likely to get even costlier in light of higher capital requirements for registering as a swap dealer 和 added compliance costs. "So 的 industry will go through a slowdown 和 witness consolidation as we are already seeing."

On a more macro footing, he agrees that 的
黑金资产化 will continue as investors seek diversity in uncertain times. As for 的
US 页岩 bonanza versus 的 natural gas exports paradigm, should exports materialise in incremental volumes, 的 [domestic] price of natural gas will eventually have to go up stateside, he adds.
"Right now, 的 price [of US natural gas] is low because it is abundant. However, to a large extent that abundance is down to it being cross-subsidised by 的 oil industry [and natural gas liquids]. I believe in one economic law –没有什么可以永远持续下去。
"As far as 的 LNG business is concerned, it will still be a reasonably good business, but not with 的 level of profitability that most people expect, once you add 的 cost of liquefaction, transportation, etc."
的 Oilholic 和 的 ex-Enron pragmatist also agreed that 的re will be a lot of additional capacity coming onstream beyond American shores. "We could be looking 在 的 price of natural gas in 的 US going up 和 global LNG prices going down. 的re will still be a decent profit margin but it's not going to be fantastic," he concludes.
And that's your lot for 的 moment! It was an absolute pleasure speaking to Dr Kaminski! Keep reading, keep it 'crude'!
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© 高拉夫·夏尔马 2014. Photo 1:文森特·卡明斯基博士at El Paso Trading Room, 莱斯大学, Houston. Photo 2: 雪佛龙 Houston, formerly 的 安然 Towers. Photo 3: Dr Kaminski & 的 Oilholic, in 的 Woodlands, 德州 , 美国 ©Gaurav Sharma,2013年11月22日。